

In Search of Lost Data: A Study of Flash Sanitization Practices

By:

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From the proceedings of

The Digital Forensic Research Conference

#### DFRWS EU 2021

March 29 - April 1, 2021

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## In Search of Lost Data: A Study of Flash Sanitization Practices

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March 30, 2021

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- Data can be recovered from disk drives unless effort is spent on its deletion
- Poor sanitization practices for second-hand market have been confirmed
- Sanitization practices are relevant if incriminating data is found on a storage device

## But what about new devices?

- 2017 Martin Westman reported that he had found non-trivial data on new USB drives
- Data may come from the reuse of memory chips in USB devices
- Reused memory chips are much cheaper than new ones

- What is the risk of acquiring evidence on new USB drives that are due to former usage (of components) of the drive, i.e., usage before it was bought?
- What factors influence the probability for the existence of non-trivial user data on new USB drives?

## Background

## Flash Memory





## NOR and NAND Flash



NAND

Input1	Input2	Output											Bit Line
D	D	1	Ground select	Word Line D	Word Line 1	Word Line 2	Word Line 3	Word Line 4	Word Line 5	Word Line G	Word Line 7	String select	
D	1	1											
1	D	1											
1	1	D	Ē.										,

## MMC, eMMC and ONFI



#### eMMC Memory



Top: Fritz Jörn, CC BY 3.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0>, via Wikimedia Commons, SDKarteoffen.jpg Bottom: "File:EMMC.jpg" by Toniperisis licensed with CC BY-SA 4.0. To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0

### The promotional USB flash drive market



## Study Design

- What is the risk of acquiring evidence on new USB drives that are due to former usage (of components) of the drive, i.e., usage before it was bought?
- What factors influence the probability for the existence of non-trivial user data on new USB drives?

- Crucial point:
  - Chip Recycling

• Thus:

What factors influence the probability of getting a new USB drive including a recycled chip?

- Hypothesis:
  - Cheap and low-quality USB drives have a higher chance of including recycled chips
- Thus:
  - Very cheap drives directly from manufacturers via Alibaba
  - Primary factors are cost and capacity

## USB drive acquisition

- Group FAU:
  - 500 drives from 10 different suppliers, 50 drives per supplier
  - Five 4 GB batches, five 2 GB batches
  - Additional 16 GB batch with 16 drives from MSAB
- Group Leiden:
  - Three 4 GB batches of different sizes
  - Additional 16 GB batch with 14 drives from MSAB
- Group Albstadt:
  - Three 2GB batches, two 200 size batches and one 100 size batch

- Non-trivial user data:
  - Data is non-trivial user data if it is clearly distinguishable from random data, e.g., viewable as an identifiable photographic image
- Drive ID
- Supplier ID
- Analyst pseudonym
- Date imaged
- Drive size in GB

- SHA256 and MD5 hash
- NAND technology
- eMMC / ONFI standard
- Chip manufacturer
- Visual features
- Data found (yes/no)
- Category of data found

### Results

	Group FAU	Group Leiden	Total
Total	516	134	650
Analyzed	484	130	614
Data found	61	14	75
Probably Recycled	59	14	73

## Types of found data

- Gifs, icons, emojis and logos
- Photos, pictures, wallpapers, maps
- Music, film and series covers and posters
- Ringtones
- RPM, TAR and ZIP archives
- Music, Videos and Movies
- Speech recordings
- Documents
- Source code





## Types of found data



## Distribution of data findings



## Visual Inspection

- Regular serial and manufacturer specific numbers and inscriptions
- Regular manufacturer logos
- Glue and Epoxy
- Scratches
- Dirt
- Flux
- Paint
- Irregular stamps
- Handwritten notes



MF







SO8CBACH

AF





PF318

Irregular stamps	Paint	Notes	Dirt	Scratches
9	7	D	4	8
19	3	6	4	D
28	10	6	8	8
	Irregular stamps 9 19 28	Irregular stamps Paint 9 7 19 3 28 10	Irregular stampsPaintNotes970193628106	Irregular stamps Paint Notes Dirt   9 7 0 4   19 3 6 4   28 10 6 8

## Correlation

- No correlation between:
  - Data findings and NAND technology, standard or signs of re-use
- Correlation between:
  - Data findings and Samsung (0.716)
  - Samsung and finding of maps (0.777)
  - Kingston and Android (0.742)
  - SanDisk and Chrome OS (0.641)



## Conclusion

- Non-negligible probability (12 %) of finding data on cheap but new USB drives ordered for promotional products
- Clear indication of weak sanitization practices in this market sector
- No clear correlation between external factors and the existence of user data
- Focus only on cheap drives
- Follow-up study with higher priced USB drives and more quality-oriented brands
  - This requires a substantially higher research budget, thus we are still **looking for possible sponsors/donors** for this experiment
  - If interested please contact me :)



# Thank you!