Nederlands Forensisch Instituut
Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid

Full-Stack Forensics? Low-Level Digital Forensics in Encryption Era

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Women in Forensic Computing

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About me …

- Japanese National Police (2007-2020)
- Netherlands Forensic Institute (2020-)
- Forensic data recovery focusing on hardware
- Just completed my PhD “Effective Mobile Forensics Through Exploiting the Memory Security”

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Digital Evidence

Data can be important evidence in court

Where do you acquire the data

On the device

On the network

In Reality


Password
Password
Password access


FORENSICS
CLOUD FORENS

In Reality

Traditional Computer Forensic



Traditional Approach: Applied to Mobile Phones

- The basic structure is the same as the stand-alone computer
- Flash Memory = HDD in Computer
  - Chip-off
  - JTAG
  - Custom Bootloader



Challenges

- Encryption
- TrustZone/Secure Enclave/Secure Boot





Secure Boot and Secure Enclave




SO NOW WHAT
DO WE DO?


CPU
DIGITAL FORENSICS
RAM
CPU
FLASH STORAGE
FLASH STORAGE
RAM
DISPLAY
FLASH STORAGE

Vertical Overview of a Mobile Phone System



Any Entry Point to compromise the TEE??

Global Platform TEE Specification

Data Acquisition != Simple Data Extraction

- Forensic officers need to think about
  - Can we get the encryption key somehow?
  - How can we run arbitrary code on the device?
  - Can we skip the secure boot ?



Case 1: Anti-Rollback

- Locked telephone through anti-rollback detection





Case 1(cont): Software Reverse Engineering



Case 1 (cont): Going Deeper

- Mon



Case 1 (cont): Getting the key and Profit!

- Found the necessary key deep in HW
- Edit the secret area and device was back to the original state!

```
0220h: 5A A2 16 28 53 D2 07 05 65 34 47 42 48 4A 01 90  Z..(S ..e4GBHJ..
0230h: 01 40 40 8A EF FF FF FF FF 03 59 0F 32 01 27 D0  .@@. .....Y.2.'
0240h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 00  ................
0250h: 50 41 53 53 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  PASS............
0260h: FF FF 35 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..5.............
0270h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0280h: 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0290h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
02A0h: 06 04 02 04 01 04 01 07 01 07 06 03 03 03 01 04  ................
02B0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ........@.......
02C0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
02D0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
02E0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
02F0h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0300h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0310h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0320h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0330h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 40  ...............@
0340h: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
0350h: 43 42 41 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 39 38 37  CBA9876543210987
0360h: 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31  6543210987654321
```



Case 2: Locked iPhone Case

- Old case (before secure enclave)
- Too many wrong password attempts already
- On-device bruteforce: Too slow (device is "password" locked)
- Side-Channel Attack (Paper published in 2021 in CHES)



Case 2 (cont): Side Channel Attack

- Preparation:
  - ROM exploit to run arbitrary code
  - Repeat AES computation 400 million times
  - Collect traces and identify the key







Case 2 (cont): Offline Brute-Force

- UiD Key identified (took years in the end)
- Plist parsed and offline brute-forcing the password
- Password found in 1 day!
- Case data extracted and police officers were so happy



Takeaways

- Mobile forensic investigations getting more complicated than ever
- However there is (almost) always a way to compromise the device
- Do not focus on one layer of the computer system when conducting forensics research
- Think out-of-the-box: Hacker's mind. Where can we sneak into the system and break the security feature?
- Keep an eye on the recent development of techniques, as well as zero-day, code leak, and other exploits